I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, a variety of steam ciphers have been proposed. Many of these use a linear feedback shift register (LFSR) with a nonlinear Boolean function to generate a keystream. However, attacks that exploit the linear characteristics of LFSR have been proposed [1] - [3] . LFSR-based stream ciphers might be vulnerable to such algebraic cryptanalysis.
In 2003, Klimov and Shamir proposed the T-function as a new primitive that can be used as an alternative to LFSR [4] . The T-function is suitable for software implementation. Though it is a form of nonlinear mapping, it uses a combination of operations including ADD, SUB, MUL, XOR, AND, and OR for a single cycle of maximal length. Klimov and Shamir insist that the T-function can be used not only for a stream cipher, but also for a block cipher and a hash function [5] .
Various T-function based stream ciphers were then proposed. In 2005, Hong et al. proposed single-cycle T-functions using the S-box properties, as well as TSC's which are stream ciphers using these proposed T-functions [6] . They reported that TSC-1 is suitable for hardware implementation while TSC-2 is a stream cipher suitable for software implementation. However, those ciphers were broken by using the T-function properties as demonstrated at the FSE 2005 rump session [7] , [8] . In the same year, Hong et al.proposed TSC-3, a new version of TSC, at eSTREAM [9] . However, shortly afterwards Muller and Peyrin broke this version [10] .
At eSTREAM 2005, Maximov proposed Mir-1, a T-function-based stream cipher [11] . The cipher uses data updated using a T-function, and it generates a keystream through randomization by an S-box whose entries change depending on a secret key. and the Mir-1 initialization [12] . Their method makes it possible to distinguish the output sequence of Mir-1 from a truly random number sequence with only three or four initial vector (IV) pairs. The amount of data theoretically needed by the method is only about 2 10 words. Thus, with a practical amount of computation, this attack could be a threat to Mir-1. This correspondence recapitulates the distinguishing attack proposed by Tsunoo et al. [12] and explains the amount of data that the attack needs in more detail. Results from an experiment to demonstrate that the proposed attack is effective are also presented, and a countermeasure against the proposed attack is described.
The Section II provides an overview of T-functions and recently proposed T-function based stream ciphers. Section III describes the structure of Mir-1. Section IV explains how the output sequence of Mir-1 can be distinguished from a truly random number sequence through the T-function properties and the Mir-1 initialization. Section V describes a countermeasure against the attack proposed in this correspondence, and Section VI concludes the correspondence.
II. T-FUNCTION
This section provides a basic explanation of the T-function. The details are provided in the original paper published by Klimov and Shamir.
A. T-Function Proposed by Klimov and Shamir
In 2002, Klimov and Shamir proposed the T-function as a new class for invertible mapping [13] . Their T-function is a single-word T-function and features single n-bit word mapping. The ith bit of a singleword T-function output depends only on the 0th through ith bits of its input. Single-word T-functions include arithmetic operations such as ADD, SUB, and MUL, and logical operations such as OR, AND, and XOR. These operations are referred to as primitive operations, and they are very useful because they can be processed within one clock and one cycle on many kinds of processor.
Klimov and Shamir used various combinations of these operations to design many kinds of T-functions. These T-functions feature a single cycle of maximal length. This kind of function could be used as an alternative to LFSR. However, a single-word T-function is less useful, because its bit size n is limited to 32 or 64 in today's processors.
In 2004, Klimov and Shamir proposed multiword T-functions, which were expanded versions of single-word T-functions [14] . Multiword T-functions define m n-bit words for mapping, and they offer a singlecycle of maximal length in the same way as single-word T-functions.
The following is a more specific description of multiword T-functions with m n-bit words. If each of the m n-bit words is represented by x k (k = 0; . . . ; m 0 1), the set of m words x is expressed as x = (x k ) m01 k=0 . The ith bit of each word [x k ] i is then denoted as
The layer of the ith bit of word x is expressed as Thus, as for multiword T-functions, the ith bit of any output word depends only on the 0th through ith bit of each input word.
B. T-Function Based Stream Ciphers and Their Cryptanalysis
This section introduces T-function based stream ciphers. The correspondence written by Klimov and Shamir [14] gave some examples of multiword T-functions. However, Mitra and Sarkar reported in 2004 that a stream cipher employing a simple output function can be broken by a time-memory trade-off attack [15] . 
A. Notation and Definition
In this correspondence, bit-wise XOR, AND, and OR are represented by 8 The secret key K EY of Mir-1 is 128-bits long and its initial vector I V is 64-bits long. They are defined as follows.
K EY = k15kk14k ...kk0 I V = I V 7 kI V 6 k ... kI V 0 : Here, ki (0 i 15) and I Vi (0 i 7) are one-byte variables.
B. Keystream Generation
This section treats Mir-1's keystream generation, which consists of roughly two parts: the loop state update (LS update) and the automata state update (AS update).
The LS update has four registers of 64-bit words x i (i = 0; 1; 2; 3). The keystream generation part of Mir-1 performs the LS update and AS update at each clock, and outputs keystream z; that is, the 64-bit B 0 computed by the AS update.
C. Initialization
This section describes Mir-1's initialization part, which also consists of roughly two parts: the key setup and the IV setup.
The key setup initializes register x i (i = 0; 1; 2; 3) and registers A and B , using a 128-bit secret key. The key setup function is shown in Fig. 4 . 
IV. DISTINGUISHING ATTACK
This section explains in detail how to apply a distinguishing attack against the Mir-1 stream cipher. Section IV-A describes the characteristics of the structure of the IV Setup and LS Update, both of which are critical for the cryptanalysis, and Section IV-B concerns the chosen IV attack, which is based on these characteristics. In Section IV-C, the amount of data needed to apply the distinguishing attack proposed in this correspondence is discussed. Section IV-D reports the results from an experimental attack.
A. Properties of IV Setup and LS Update
This section describes the properties of the IV setup and LS update, on which the key setup has no particular influence.
First, we explain the structural properties of the IV setup. As shown in Fig. 5 , the IV setup divides a 64-bit IV into eight 8-bit data, each of which is substituted in the secret S-box to be XORed with each register. Thus, if entries of the secret S-box are unknowns, then each register is XORed with an unknown. Here, we consider an IV where each byte of IV is the same, I V a = (akak...ka) to the IV setup. Then the data XORed with each register in the IV setup are as shown in Fig. 6 .
As shown in Fig. 6 , the IV has no influence over registers x0 , x1 , x2 , or x3 at step 2, regardless of the value of a. At steps 1 and 3, all the data XORed with each register becomes S[a]. Though entries of the secret S-box are unknown because of their dependence on the secret key, it is apparent that all the registers are XORed with the same value.
Next, we describe the LS update properties. As explained in Section II-A, as far as multiword T-functions are concerned, the nth bit of any output word depends only on the 0th through nth bit of each input word. Thus, if differential 1 i is given as the initial value of register xi (i = 0; 1; 2; 3), and if all of the 0th through nth bits of differential 1 i are 0, then the differential of the 0th through nth bits of register x i is always 0, regardless of the number of times the LS update is performed.
As shown in Fig. 6 , if an IV of type (akak...ka) is input to IV setup, the IV has no influence over the 0th through 31st bits of register xi(i = 0; 1; 2; 3). Consequently, while the secret key is fixed, no changes are made on the 0th through 31st bits of register x i , regardless of the number of times the LS update is performed, even if I V a is changed.
Section IV-B describes the cryptanalysis where these two properties are exploited.
B. Differential Attack Using Chosen IVs
This section describes an attack method that exploits the two properties described in Section IV-A. For this attack to succeed, the following preconditions must be met:
• the secret key is fixed during the attack;
• attackers can choose the IV freely;
• attackers can obtain the keystream generated using the given IV.
First, a pair of IVs, namely I V a = (akak . . . ka) and I V b = (bkbk . . . kb), is provided for the IV setup. Note that all the bytes of I V a as well as those of I V b have the same value. Because of the structural properties of the IV setup described in Section IV-A, the difference between each of the lower 32 bits of register xi(i = 0; 1; 2; 3) updated by I V a and the corresponding bits updated by I V b becomes 0. In other words, the equation given below holds true, where xa i and xbi respectively represent the register xi (i = 0; 1; 2; 3) updated by I V a and the register updated by I V b. Here, x i are the state variables after the key setup, and xa i and xb i are the state variables after step 3 in the IV setup. Here, the entries of the secret S-box are unknowns. We can assume, though, that the equation below is satisfied
If the condition of (2) is met, the relation described in (3) holds true for bit 32 of register xa i and bit 32 of register xb i . 
Consequently, the difference between each of the lower 33 bits of register x i (i = 0; 1; 2; 3) updated by I V a and the corresponding bit updated by I V b becomes 0. As described in Section IV-A, because of the LS update properties (4) always holds true for the IV setup and the keystream generation, regardless of the number of times the LS update is performed.
Here, we consider the keystream generation, presuming that the condition of (2) is met. Fig. 7 outlines the AS update for three clocks. Though the AS update uses addition in mod 2 64 , this operation can be substituted by XOR if only the least significant bit is used for cryptanalysis. In Fig. 7 , addition in mod 2 64 is substituted by XOR, taking only the least significant bit into account.
To simplify the explanation given here, the two 64-bit words inserted by the LS update are represented by x20 = ( 
is chosen for the keystreams generated by I V a and I V b, the equation described below holds true because the unknown entries of the secret S-box take the same input, resulting in the same secret S-box output.
Thus, if we take the XOR of (5) and (6), and substitute the relations (7) through (10), the following relation holds: 
Consequently, if any given pair of I V a and I V b satisfies (2), (11) always holds true at time t when (9) holds true. The Section V explains why (11) can be used as a distinguisher.
C. Probability That a Distinguisher Holds True and the Required Amount of Data
This section explains the success probability that (11) used as a distinguisher holds true. If the output sequences that Mir-1 outputs are truly random number sequences, the probability that a distinguisher, or (11), holds true is 2 01 . The discussion that follows assumes that the internal state and keystream that are updated by distinct IVs are independently and uniformly distributed. The probability that (9) is satisfied becomes 2 08 . However, attackers can always satisfy (9) , since the keystream is a known value for them. The probability that (2) is satisfied is 2 01 , and it equals the probability that the least significant bits of secret S-box entries that are randomly chosen are identical to each other. If (2) is not satisfied, and if the probability that (11) holds true is then ideally 2 01 , the probability P d that (11) Thus, P d is greater than 2 01 ; that is, the probability for a truly random number sequence. If the output sequences of Mir-1 are truly random number sequences, then the probability that (11) holds true is 2 01 .
In the following, we discuss the amount of data required to distinguish between a Mir-1 output sequence and a truly random number sequence when (11) is used as a distinguisher. As reported [16] , the amount of data needed to make a distinction between these two distributions is as stated in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1:
When event e occurs, O( 1 pq ) samples are required to distinguish X (the distribution of an event that occurs with probability p 1) from Y (the distribution of an event that occurs with probability p(q + 1)) with a nonnegligible success probability.
The theorem above holds if p 1. It has also been reported [17] that the amount of data required to distinguish between two distributions is as follows, if p = 2 01 . For details, see Appendix. In this correspondence, event e is the event for which (11) holds true. The distribution of event e for truly random number sequences should be X, while that for a Mir-1 output sequence should be Y . Thus, p = 2 01 , q = 2 01 , and, consequently, the amount of data required for the attack becomes approximately 2 2 . Taking into account that a keystream which satisfies (9) 
D. Results of Experiment
We confirmed that (11) can serve to distinguish a Mir-1 output sequence from a truly random number sequence. The experimental attack was made by following the steps below. 2) Find the time t when the least significant bytes of the keystreams generated from IV 0 and IV j are identical (j = 1; . . . ; 2 w ). The time t exists at a probability of 2 08 , supposing that the Mir-1
keystream is a truly random number sequence. 3) Count the IV pairs for which (11) holds true for the keystream generated from either IV 0 or IV j at time t that meets the conditions described in step 2). If the above equation is satisfied, judge that the output sequence is not a random number sequence. 5) Provide 1000 secret keys randomly and repeat steps 1) through 4), to obtain the rejection rate for these sequences. Table I shows the results of this experiment. Table I shows that when 2 2 data are provided and (11) is used as a distinguisher, the sequence rejection rate is 71.2%, an advantage of more than 40% over the rejection rate for a truly random number sequence. The probability that the least significant byte of a keystream generated from the chosen IV pair will be identical is about 2 08 , as we expected. Thus, this experiment demonstrated that the attack proposed in this correspondence can distinguish a Mir-1 output sequence from a truly random number sequence at higher probability by using about 
V. COUNTERMEASURE
This section proposes a countermeasure to make Mir-1 resistant to the cryptanalysis described in Section IV. This countermeasure was developed, not to make changes to the AS update to generate a keystream, but to improve the initialization, especially the IV setup, because the attack proposed in this correspondence exploits the properties of the LS update and IV setup.
First, to prevent the use of LS update properties for cryptanalysis, a loop state permutation (LS permutation), as shown in Fig. 8 , is added just after the LS update during IV setup processing.
Even if the chosen IVs described in this correspondence are provided, the differential inserted in byte 4 of state x is spread to a more significant byte by the LS update, and then the effect is extended to a less significant byte and adjacent word by LS permutation. Thus, even if the chosen IV's are provided, the differential of 0 is never spread at , it guarantees 2 64 patterns of IV as the value right after IV setup. This means that nothing can influence the properties of the LS update-that is, the longest periodicity with a single cycle-during keystream generation. Though this countermeasure would slow the processing speed slightly, it would be a great disadvantage in the implementation of the cipher, taking into account that Mir-1 is the cipher algorithm specified for a 64-bit processor. Next, change the location of IV insertion, as shown in Fig. 9 , so that the IV setup properties cannot be exploited for cryptanalysis. 
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This modification inserts the differential in each word of state x without fail, even if one provides an IV which causes all the bytes to have the same value is provided. In other words, this countermeasure prevents attackers from providing IVs that mask the input differential. Since rotate shift processing shifts the byte position of the differential inserted in each state x by 16 bits, the LS update should randomize the differential from the less significant byte of the differential. This countermeasure should not lead to slower processing, because no change is made to the number of times that the S-box is looked up in 8-bit units, or to the number of times that exclusive OR is implemented. In fact, this countermeasure is likely to speed up performance, because Mir-1 is a cipher algorithm for 64-bit processors and exclusive OR can still be implemented as a 64-bit variable.
VI. CONCLUSION
This correspondence describes the cryptanalysis of Mir-1, a new T-function based stream cipher. The IV used for the stream cipher is a parameter that users can choose freely. Thus, an attack using the chosen IV's can be a threat. This correspondence proposes an effective distinguisher that uses the chosen IV's and the structural properties of the Mir-1 initialization. With a mere three or four chosen IV pairs, the attack method proposed in this correspondence distinguishes a Mir-1 output sequence from a truly random number sequence at a high probability. The theoretical amount of data required for the attack is no more than about 2 10 words. This is the only cryptanalysis that can be applied against Mir-1, as far as we know. It must be noted, however, that the approach described here does not work as an attack to obtain the secret key or the entire internal state. The attack method proposed in this correspondence makes good use of the T-function properties. This is an effective way to attack a T-function based stream cipher. Stream ciphers based on T-functions will probably be used as an alternative to LFSR. However, designers of T-function based stream ciphers should pay attention to this vulnerability to make their ciphers resistant to such attacks.
This correspondence also describes a modification made to the initialization to make Mir-1 resistant against the attack proposed in this correspondence. The countermeasure we propose can prevent statistical deviation among the keystreams generated from distinct IV's. This countermeasure never weakens the resistance to attacks that exploit the AS update structure since no modification is made to the structure. Thus, if Mir-1 is broken after the countermeasure proposed in this correspondence is taken, this would be due to the vulnerability inherent in the original Mir-1 algorithm, and improvements to the Mir-1 structure specific to the attack would then be needed. The modified Mir-1 algorithm described in this correspondence thus seems likely to become an interesting topic concerning security of the T-function based stream cipher.
APPENDIX AMOUNT OF DATA REQUIRED TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN TWO DISTRIBUTIONS
This section explains the amount of data required to distinguish between two distributions X (the distribution of an event that occurs with probability p) and Y (the distribution of an event that occurs with probability p(1 + q)) [16] , [17] . 
The variances for events X and Y are
The deviations from the mean for events X and Y are (X) = V (X) = tp(1 0 p) (Y ) = V (Y ) = tp(1 + q)f1 0 p(1 + q)g t outcomes of event e are needed to distinguish event distribution Y from event distribution X, so the difference between the number of times event Y occurs and that for event X becomes equal to or greater than X's deviation from the mean. 
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the set 1 q of infinite sequences over q as our starting point, where q is the finite field with q elements, q a power of a prime p [14] . To assess the randomness of such 1 q -sequences one may compute their linear and jump complexity profiles. These profiles as well as the p-adic complexity should behave well in the sense that not too many large jumps occur and on average, for linear or p-adic complexity, q 0 1 out of every 2q respectively q symbols should lead to a jump [3] .
A function f: 1 q ! 1 q is called an isometry, if it preserves distance (see Section II-C). We shall show that linear and jump complexity as well as p-adic FCSR and AFSR register synthesis all induce isometries. Since isometries map an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) symbol sequence onto an i.i.d. sequence, we can examine the result of applying the isometry using known bounds on coin tossing and more generally Bernoulli experiments, like the Law of the Iterated Logarithm. If the result does not appear to be random according to this law, the symbol sequence also should be considered nonrandom from a cryptanalytic point of view.
The outline of the correspondence is as follows.
Section II starts with notations and then introduces an isometry K on 1 q , where K(a) describes the partial denominators of the continued fraction expansion of the generating function G(a) for a 2 1 q .
Being an isometry, K is information preserving and, as we shall see, 
